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TAMING TWOMBLY: AN UPDATE AFTER 
MATRIXX 
EDWARD A. HARTNETT* 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
For better or worse, my approach to Twombly1 and Iqbal2 has been one of 
accommodation rather than battle, seeking, in the common law tradition, to 
assimilate these decisions into the body of law of which they are a part. I have 
suggested strategies for lawyers to use in response to these decisions.3 I have 
also proposed a Rule amendment that I believe meets the primary concerns of 
both the plaintiff and defense bar.4 For these efforts, I have been called an 
optimist5—a charge to which I plead guilty. 
I see little hope of these decisions being overruled.6 Unlike some areas, 
including federalism, the First Amendment, and substantive due process, where 
justices have adhered to their dissenting views and refused to accept their losses 
as binding precedent,7 no one on the Supreme Court seems inclined to refight 
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 1.  Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
 2.  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 555 U.S. 662 (2009). 
 3.  See Edward A. Hartnett, Taming Twombly, Even After Iqbal, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 473 (2010). 
 4.  See Edward A. Hartnett, Responding to Twombly and Iqbal: Where Do We Go from Here?, 95 
IOWA L. REV. BULL. 24 (2010). 
 5.  See Kevin Clermont & Stephen C. Yeazell, Inventing Tests, Destabilizing Systems, 95 IOWA L. 
REV. 821, 840 n.69 (2010). 
 6.  Cf. Luke Meier, Why Twombly is Good Law (But Poorly Drafted) and Iqbal Will Be 
Overturned, 87 IND. L.J. (forthcoming 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1734791. 
 7.  See, e.g., Fed. Election Comm’n v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 163–64 (2003) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring in the judgment) (adhering to his view that earlier decisions “misapprehended basic First 
Amendment principles” and giving those decisions no precedential weight); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. 
Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 431 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (adhering to her view regarding due 
process limitations on punitive damages); Alderman v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 700, 702 n.2 (2001) 
(Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (noting his adherence to his “previously stated views 
on the proper scope of the Commerce Clause”); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 97 (2000) 
(Stevens, J., dissenting in part) (“I remain convinced that Union Gas was correctly decided and that the 
decision of five Justices in Seminole Tribe to overrule that case was profoundly misguided. Despite my 
respect for stare decisis, I am unwilling to accept Seminole Tribe as controlling precedent.”); Alden v. 
Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 800 n.33, 814 (1999) (Souter, J., dissenting) (adhering to the view that the 
“Eleventh Amendment was never intended to bar federal-question suits against the States in federal 
court” and describing the majority’s approach as “probably . . . fleeting”); Gen. Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 
519 U.S. 278, 312 (1997) (Scalia, J., concurring) (noting his “continuing adherence to the view that the 
so-called ‘negative’ Commerce Clause is an unjustified judicial invention, not to be expanded beyond 
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Twombly and Iqbal. In the past term, both Justice Ginsburg and Justice 
Sotomayor have authored opinions for the Court that rely on the Twombly and 
Iqbal precedents.8 With these Justices accommodating themselves to Twombly 
and Iqbal, overruling is nearly impossible to imagine. Nor have I seen anything 
suggesting that a Rule amendment repudiating them outright would have any 
traction, particularly with the Federal Judicial Center’s report to the Judicial 
Conference Advisory Committee on Civil Rules unable to find any statistically 
significant increase in the rate at which motions to dismiss for failure to state a 
claim have been granted (except in cases challenging financial instruments).9 
And despite my friend Steve Burbank’s valiant efforts,10 I also think that the 
prospect of Congressional repudiation died with the 111th Congress, especially 
with the defeat of Senator Arlen Specter. As far as I can see, accommodation is 
the only game in town. 
My route to this accommodationist approach is worth explaining. My work 
on this issue began with a presentation at the Thirty-Second Annual Judicial 
 
its existing domain”). 
 8.  Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 131 S. Ct. 1309, 1314 (2011) (Sotomayor, J., for a 
unanimous court) (holding that plaintiffs “have alleged facts plausibly suggesting that reasonable 
investors would have viewed these particular reports as material”); Skinner v. Switzer, 131 S. Ct. 1289, 
1296 (2011) (Ginsburg, J.) (stating that Rule 8(a)(2) “generally requires only a plausible ‘short and 
plain’ statement of the plaintiff's claim”). It is true that Skinner does not cite Twombly and Iqbal, but it 
does refer to the requirement of plausibility. And Matrixx prominently cites both decisions. 131 S. Ct. 
at 1323. 
 9.  See JOE S. CECIL ET AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., MOTIONS TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE 
A CLAIM AFTER IQBAL, REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL 
RULES (2011). The stability of a grant rate, of course, does not mean that Twombly and Iqbal are 
having no significant effect, because lawyers take those decisions into account in making litigation 
decisions and it may be that defense counsel are filing so many more motions to dismiss that they would 
not have previously filed that the grant rate remains stable. The FJC study does show an increase in 
filing motions, but cannot establish whether more cases are being dismissed because the data sets differ. 
  One study of Twombly takes into account that “in response to a legal change, plaintiffs and 
defendants may change their legal strategy” so that “[t]he rate at which plaintiffs or defendants prevail 
in litigation may not change, even after a sharp change in how courts decide cases.” William H.J. 
Hubbard, The Problem of Measuring Legal Change, with Application to Bell Atlantic v. Twombly 
(Univ. of Chi., Olin Law & Econ. Program, Working Paper No. 575, 2011), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstraact=1883831. Hubbard finds “fairly precise zeros for the effects of Twombly on 
both the grant rate of motions to dismiss and the overall rate of dismissal among filed cases.” Id. at 31. 
However, a forthcoming note that takes party selection into account suggests that Twombly and Iqbal 
are having an effect on at least eighteen percent of cases. Jonah B. Gelbach, Locking the Doors to 
Discovery? Conceptual Challenges in and Empirical Results for Assessing the Effects of Twombly and 
Iqbal on Access to Discovery, 121 YALE L.J. (forthcoming), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1957363. 
  My point is not that Twombly and Iqbal are having no effect, but rather that with substantial 
empirical study suggesting less effect than critics predicted, the rulemakers are likely to be rather 
hesitant to repudiate major Supreme Court decisions. See Civil Rules Advisory Committee, Draft 
Minutes, Apr. 4–5, 2011, 22 (suggesting that the “Court would be receptive if the Committee could 
show a major problem . . . . But that may not be likely[]”). Perhaps if Gelbach’s findings are replicated, 
that may change. 
 10. See Hearing on Whether the Supreme Court has Limited Americans’ Access to Court Before the 
S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 22 (2009) (Prepared Statement of Stephen B. Burbank, David 
Berger Professor for the Administration of Justice, University of Pennsylvania) (arguing for passage of 
an Act of Congress responding to Twombly and Iqbal). 
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Conference of the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey in 
March of 2008. An academic who treated that audience of district judges, 
magistrate judges, and practicing lawyers to an argument that a Supreme Court 
decision was wrong-headed and illegitimate would have been of scant assistance 
to them. Of course, criticizing judicial decisions is one important role of legal 
academics, and one in which I happily engage.11 But as I saw it, and continue to 
see it, another role of legal academics is to help judges and lawyers understand 
and deal with the legal doctrine that confronts them. For that reason, I am 
proud rather than embarrassed to be a co-author of a leading practice treatise,12 
a genre of legal writing that is as accommodationist as one can imagine. 
Moreover, there has been no shortage of legal academics heaping criticism 
on the Court. There has been, however, a real shortage of scholarship that 
might help lawyers and judges to avoid the injustices that those critics feared. 
For similar reasons, I do not think that the audience at this conference, 
consisting primarily of plaintiff’s lawyers, would find much value (apart perhaps 
from the emotional inspiration akin to that from a campaign rally) in hearing 
yet another critique of Twombly and Iqbal. Instead, I think the most useful 
contribution I can make is to provide a bit of a status report on the how efforts 
to tame Twombly and Iqbal are faring. My hope is to convince you both to try 
my strategies and to support my proposal—or at least to tell me why not. 
II 
WHAT IS CONCLUSORY? WHAT IS PLAUSIBLE? 
The basic framework for evaluating a complaint that emerges from these 
decisions is as follows: A court distinguishes between factual allegations and 
conclusory allegations. It assumes the truth of the factual allegations, but not 
the conclusory allegations. Finally, it assesses, using common sense and judicial 
experience, whether the claim is plausible.13 
Under this framework, the distinction between factual allegations and 
conclusory allegations is crucial, for it marks the line between what will be 
 
 11.  See, e.g., Edward A. Hartnett, Congress Clears Its Throat, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 553 (2005); 
Edward A. Hartnett, Questioning Certiorari: Some Reflections Seventy-Five Years After the Judges’ Bill, 
100 COLUM. L. REV. 1643 (2000); Edward A. Hartnett, The Standing of the United States: How 
Criminal Prosecutions Show That Standing Doctrine Is Looking for Answers in All the Wrong Places, 97 
MICH. L. REV. 2239 (1999); Edward A. Hartnett, Ties in the Supreme Court of New Jersey, 32 SETON 
HALL L. REV. 735 (2003). The last-listed of these articles contributed to a bit of a constitutional crisis in 
New Jersey earlier this year. See Edward A. Hartnett, Seeking a Path to Restore Order in the New Jersey 
Supreme Court, THE STAR-LEDGER, Dec. 15, 2010, available at 2010 WLNR 24793041; Paul Mulshine, 
In This Schoolyard Fight, Christie Could Have Fun During Recess, THE STAR-LEDGER, Dec. 14, 2010 
available at 2010 WLNR 24780246. 
 12.  EUGENE GRESSMAN ET AL., SUPREME COURT PRACTICE (9th ed. 2007).  
 13.  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009) (“[A] court considering a motion to dismiss can 
choose to begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not 
entitled to the assumption of truth. While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, 
they must be supported by factual allegations. When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court 
should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to 
relief.”). 
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assumed to be true and what will not be assumed to be true. Some have argued 
that the distinction is incoherent,14 and some fear an infinite regress: any 
allegation can be considered “conclusory” in the sense that one can always ask 
for the underlying information that supports an allegation.15 I have argued that 
the label “conclusory,” in the context of Twombly and Iqbal, should be limited 
to allegations that are essentially equivalent to the elements of a right of action. 
So understood, the distinction is not incoherent, and it avoids the risk of an 
infinite regress.16 Instead, it works to insist that a plaintiff, in the words of 
Charles Clark, take “one step further back” from the “final and ultimate 
conclusion which the court is to make in deciding the case for him.”17 
Some feared that the plausibility test would license judges to evaluate the 
believability of any (or all) allegations in a complaint. I have argued instead that 
the plausibility test can be understood as equivalent to the traditional insistence 
that the inferences that a plaintiff asks a court to draw must be reasonable.18 So 
understood, a court separates the factual allegations from the conclusions as to 
each element of the right of action, assumes the former to be true, and then asks 
whether the latter (the conclusions as to each element of the right of action) can 
reasonably be inferred from the former (the factual allegations). 
How are these arguments faring in the lower courts? Although I make no 
claim to have read all of the thousands of cases that cite Twombly and Iqbal,19 I 
have seen numerous cases that use the term “conclusory” to describe 
allegations that are essentially equivalent to the elements of a right of action 
and scant evidence in these courts of any move toward the feared infinite 
regress.20 Professor Alex Reinert catalogues a number of cases that he views as 
 
 14.  Robert G. Bone, Plausibility Pleading Revisited and Revised: A Comment on Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 
85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 849, 867 (2010). 
 15.  See Adam N. Steinman, The Pleading Problem, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1293, 1318 (2010) 
(explaining the “endless cascade of inquiry” that could result if “[e]ach allegation that might be offered 
to ‘plausibly suggest’ some other allegation would itself require support, and so on and so on”). 
 16.  See Hartnett, supra note 3, at 491–92. 
 17.  Id. at 491 (quotations omitted) (citing Clark). 
 18.  Id. at 484–85. 
 19.  A Westlaw search for “Twombly /p Iqbal”—which is surely an underinclusive search—
returned 14,648 hits on July 29, 2011. A particularly valuable resource for anyone trying to keep track 
of cases discussing and applying Twombly and Iqbal is the periodically revised memorandum by 
Andrea Kuperman, Rules Law Clerk to Judge Lee H. Rosenthal, Chair of the Judicial Conference 
Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, available on the United States Courts web page. See 
Memorandum from Andrea Kuperman, Rules Law Clerk to Judge Lee H. Rosenthal, to Civil Rules 
Comm. & Standing Rules Comm. (Mar. 29, 2011) available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/ 
RulesAndPolicies/rules/Iqbal_memo_March_2011.pdf. 
 20.  See, e.g., Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 131 (3d Cir. 2010) (treating an allegation 
that was, in essence, that the supervisory defendants told other defendants to do what they did as a 
formulaic recitation of the elements of a supervisory liability claim and hence conclusory); Hayden v. 
Paterson, 594 F.3d 150, 162 (2d Cir. 2010) (identifying as conclusory those allegations that are “in effect 
and intent . . . the very assertion that plaintiffs must prove”); Pa. Prison Soc’y v. Cortes, 622 F.3d 215, 
233 (3d Cir. 2010) (treating an allegation that a state constitutional amendment “impose[d] additional 
punishment” as conclusory) (internal quotations omitted); In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 618 
F.3d 300, 362 (3d Cir. 2010) (treating as conclusory an allegation of agreement); Brookhart v. Rohr, 385 
F. App’x 67, 70 (3d Cir. 2010) (treating as conclusory an allegation of pattern of racketeering activity); 
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reflecting confusion in the lower courts about what kinds of allegations are 
properly labeled conclusory.21 I do not doubt that there is some confusion and 
conflict. However, it is worth noting that the same allegation might properly be 
considered conclusory in one case, and not in another, because the conclusory 
nature of an allegation should not be judged in the abstract, but in the context 
of a particular right of action. What is conclusory depends on the conclusions 
that are necessary for relief under a particular right of action. I do not pretend 
that this reconciles all the cases, but rather that it offers a path out of the 
confusion and conflict. 
Similarly, I see little evidence that the plausibility test is being used by 
judges to evaluate the believability of any (or all) allegations in a complaint. 
Overwhelmingly, courts recognize that the plausibility test is about the 
reasonableness of inferences from factual allegations to conclusions, not about 
 
Rhodes v. Prince, 360 F. App’x 555, 559 (5th Cir. 2010) (treating an allegation of arrest as conclusory 
“[b]ecause an ‘arrest’ is a legal conclusion under the Fourth Amendment and a necessary element of a 
false arrest claim”); In re NM Holdings Co., 622 F.3d 613, 623 (6th Cir. 2010) (treating as conclusory an 
allegation that was at most a formulaic recitation of the causation element of a professional negligence 
claim); Telesaurus VPC, L.L.C. v. Power, 623 F.3d 998, 1005 (9th Cir. 2010) (treating as conclusory an 
allegation that the defendant was a common carrier); Mecca v. United States, 389 F. App’x 775, 780 
(10th Cir. 2010) (treating as conclusory an allegation that defendants “agreed, by words or conduct, to 
accomplish an unlawful goal or accomplish a goal through unlawful means”) (internal quotations 
omitted); Jacobs v. Tempur-Pedic Int’l, Inc., 626 F.3d 1327, 1338–39 (11th Cir. 2010) (treating as 
conclusory an allegation that visco-elastic foam mattresses comprise a relevant product market); 
Speaker v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. Ctr. For Disease Control & Prevention, 623 F.3d 
1371, 1381 (11th Cir. 2010) (stating that the plaintiff “must do more than recite these statutory elements 
in conclusory fashion”); Edwards v. Prime, Inc., 602 F.3d 1276, 1300–01 (11th Cir. 2010) (treating as 
conclusory an allegation that plaintiff “was subjected to a hostile discriminatory environment on the 
basis of his race”) (internal quotations omitted); Arar v. Ashcroft, 584 F.3d 559, 617 (2d Cir. 2009) (en 
banc) (Parker, J., dissenting) (“Allegations are deemed ‘conclusory’ where they recite only the 
elements of the claim.”); McTernan v. City of York, Pa., 577 F.3d 521, 532 (3d Cir. 2009) (treating as 
conclusory allegations that a ramp was a public forum, that defendants inhibited plaintiffs from 
exercising their religion, and that defendants’ actions constituted a substantial burden on plaintiffs’ 
religious exercise); Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d 250, 259 (4th Cir. 
2009) (referring to a “conclusory allegation of an element of the immunity claim”); Floyd v. City of 
Kenner, La., 352 F. App’x 890, 898 (5th Cir. 2009) (treating as conclusory an allegation that defendant 
participated in, approved, and directed the filing of false and misleading affidavits); Hensley Mfg. v. 
ProPride, Inc. 579 F.3d 603, 611 (6th Cir. 2009) (treating as conclusory an allegation that defendant 
created “a strong likelihood of confusion in the marketplace as to the source of origin and sponsorship 
of the goods”) (internal quotations omitted); Brooks v. Ross, 578 F.3d 574, 582 (7th Cir. 2009) (treating 
as conclusory an allegation that defendant knowingly, intentionally, and maliciously prosecuted 
plaintiff in retaliation for exercising his rights); McAdams v. McCord, 584 F.3d 1111, 1114 (8th Cir. 
2009) (treating as conclusory an allegation that plaintiff’s loss was “a direct and proximate result of 
Defendants’ fraudulent misrepresentations and omission of material facts”) (internal quotations 
omitted); Delta Mech., Inc., v. Garden City Grp., 345 F. App’x 232, 234–35 (9th Cir. 2009) (Ikuta, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (treating as conclusory an allegation that the plaintiff is an 
intended third-party beneficiary); Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 578 F.3d 1252, 1266 (11th Cir. 2009) 
(treating as conclusory an allegation that paramilitary security forces acted under color of state law); 
Chao v. Ballista, 630 F. Supp. 2d 170, 177 (D. Mass. 2009) (“Allegations become ‘conclusory’ where 
they recite only the elements of the claim . . . .”); cf. Peñalbert-Rosa v. Fortuño-Burset, 631 F.3d 592, 
595 (1st Cir. 2011) (describing an allegation as to state of mind as a factual allegation rather than an 
“ultimate legal conclusion[]” but still treating it as conclusory).  
 21.  Alex Reinert, Pleading As Information-Forcing, 75 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 1, 2012 at 1, 
10. 
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the believability of factual allegations.22 There are occasional exceptions, where 
judges find factual allegations so outlandish as to be beyond belief, but in doing 
so, they rely on Justice Souter’s dissenting opinion in Iqbal, and its discussion of 
time travel and little green men from Mars.23 
Ironically, the biggest threat I see to the prospect of confining the category 
of conclusory allegations to those that are equivalent to the elements of the 
right of action comes from Justice Sotomayor’s recent opinion in Matrixx.24 The 
Matrixx case involved a securities fraud claim under section 10(b) and Rule 
10b-525 against the manufacturer of an over-the-counter medication, Zicam. The 
plaintiffs alleged that the manufacturer’s failure to reveal reports that linked 
Zicam to anosmia (the loss of smell) was a material omission. The Court 
observed that one element of such a claim was “a material misrepresentation or 
omission by the defendant” and that materiality is satisfied when there is “a 
substantial likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted fact would have been 
viewed by the reasonable investor as having significantly altered the total mix of 
information made available.”26 It held that the complaint should not have been 
dismissed because the plaintiffs “alleged facts plausibly suggesting that 
reasonable investors would have viewed these particular reports as material.”27 
So far, so good. Although the complaint included an allegation that 
“defendants materially misled the investing public, thereby inflating the price of 
Matrixx common stock, by publicly issuing false and misleading statements and 
omitting to disclose material adverse facts regarding Zicam, necessary to make 
defendants’ statements, as set forth herein not false and misleading,”28 the Court 
did not simply assume that allegation to be true. If it had, the opinion could 
have been quite short, simply announcing that, assuming that this allegation 
were true, the omissions were material. Instead, without specifically adverting 
to this allegation—and not including it in the recitation of the “facts . . . which 
the courts below properly assumed to be true”29—it treated this allegation as 
conclusory and asked whether the factual allegations plausibly supported this 
conclusion of materiality. Once it concluded that the factual allegations 
plausibly supported the conclusion of materiality, it held that the complaint 
 
 22.  See, e.g., Speaker, 623 F.3d at 1386 (11th Cir. 2010) (noting that the plaintiff “need not prove 
his case on the pleadings,” but “merely provide enough factual material to raise a reasonable inference, 
and thus a plausible claim” that the defendant was the source of the disclosures at issue). 
 23.  See Tooley v. Napolitano, 586 F.3d 1006, 1009–10 (D.C. Cir. 2009); cf. Atkins v. City of 
Chicago, 631 F.3d 823, 830–32 (7th Cir. 2011) (finding some factual allegations unrealistic or 
nonsensical, others contradictory, and others “not impossible” but “highly implausible,” and concluding 
that a district court “has to consider all these features of a complaint en route to deciding whether the 
complaint has enough substance to warrant putting the defendant to the expense of discovery”). 
 24.  Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 131 S. Ct. 1309 (2011). 
 25.  15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b–5 (2011). 
 26.  Matrixx, 131 S. Ct. at 1317–18 (2011) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
 27.  Id. at 1314. 
 28.  Consolidated Amended Complaint at ¶ 59, Siracusano v. Matrixx Initiatives, Inc., 585 F.3d 
1167 (9th Cir. 2009) (No. 06-15677). 
 29.  Matrixx, 131 S. Ct. at 1314. 
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adequately alleged materiality. 
However, the opinion also addresses the plausibility of a causal link between 
Zicam and anosmia. It cites Twombly and Iqbal immediately before stating, 
“The information provided to Matrixx by medical experts revealed a plausible 
causal relationship between Zicam Cold Remedy and anosmia.”30 Moreover, it 
cites Twombly (and recites its plausibility standard) before stating that 
plaintiffs’ “allegations plausibly suggest that [two medical professionals’] 
conclusions were based on reliable evidence of a causal link between Zicam and 
anosmia.”31 In addition, it notes that the complaint alleges that studies 
confirmed the toxicity of zinc (one of the ingredients in Zicam) and that “the 
existence of the studies suggests a plausible biological link between zinc and 
anosmia.”32 
Of course, in a tort action against the manufacturer by someone who lost his 
sense of smell, such causation would be an element of the right of action. But in 
a 10b-5 case, that causation is not an element, and addressing the plausibility of 
that causal link suggests that the Court might be applying the plausibility 
requirement more broadly to other allegations of a complaint. 
A more limited reading is nonetheless possible, and preferable: If an 
element of a right of action depends on a chain of inferences, then in order for 
the ultimate conclusion regarding that element to be plausible, each link in the 
chain of inference must be plausible. In Matrixx, the chain of inferences 
regarding materiality was something like this: 
Medical experts suspect that there is a causal link between Zicam and anosmia. 
 
Consumers, regulators, and doctors would be concerned about the suspected causal 
link between Zicam and anosmia, thereby hurting sales. 
 
Reasonable investors would think that the suspected causal link between Zicam and 
anosmia is important. 
Viewed this way, the discussion of the plausibility of a causal link in Matrixx 
is included only to evaluate the plausibility of the ultimate inference that 
reasonable investors would think the claimed causal link to be important. If the 
claimed causal link were itself implausible (the Court seems to assume), then 
consumers, regulators, and doctors would not be concerned, and neither would 
reasonable investors. 
Matrixx is helpful in one regard: It seems to make clear that the 
determination of plausibility is to be made on an element-by-element basis. 
Twombly and Iqbal referred to the plausibility of the claim, but in each case, 
only one element was at issue; upon finding one element implausible, the claim 
 
 30.  Id. at 1323; see also id. at 1322 (“Assuming the complaint’s allegations to be true, as we must, 
Matrixx received information that plausibly indicated a reliable causal link between Zicam and 
anosmia.”). 
 31.  Id. at 1322 n.12. 
 32.  Id. at n.13. 
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failed. Matrixx involved two elements, materiality and scienter, and the Court 
evaluated them separately, determining the sufficiency of the element of 
materiality under the plausibility standard of Twombly and Iqbal, and the 
sufficiency of the element of scienter under the standard set by the Private 
Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA).33 Significantly, after determining 
that the allegations regarding each element were sufficient, it did not evaluate 
the plausibility of the 10b-5 claim taken as a whole, but simply concluded that 
the court of appeals was correct that the complaint should not have been 
dismissed. This is significant, not only as a clarification of the approach lower 
courts should take, but also because the alternative of evaluating the plausibility 
of the claim as a whole could lead to the dismissal of more complaints if courts 
adopted a version of the product rule.34 If a court were to evaluate the 
plausibility of the claim as a whole, it might determine that each of (say) six 
elements was itself plausible, but that the simultaneous combination of all six 
elements was not plausible—just as the likelihood of any particular child being 
a girl is 1/2, while the likelihood of having a family of six girls is 
1/64 (
1/2 times 
1/2 
times 1/2 times 
1/2 times 
1/2 times 
1/2). 
Some contend that assessing plausibility inherently involves a comparative 
analysis of competing inferences.35 This is certainly true for scienter under the 
PSLRA, which requires that the inference of scienter be “at least as compelling 
as any opposing inference one could draw from the facts alleged.”36 It may well 
be true at trial, when one is choosing the best inference, and typically true at 
other stages of litigation when adversaries are offering competing inferences.37 
I am not fully convinced that determining plausibility is necessarily 
comparative. It seems to me that if an inference is sufficiently in accord with 
common experience, it might well be judged plausible even without comparing 
it to other conceivable inferences. Likewise, if an inference is sufficiently out of 
whack with common experience—such as inferring from the fact that I am 
Derek Jeter’s second cousin once removed to the conclusion that I am a star 
Major League Baseball player—it can be rejected as implausible without 
comparing it to other conceivable inferences. (Perhaps some would say that the 
comparison is implicit and unarticulated.) Nevertheless, in deciding whether a 
suggested inference is plausible, it is certainly commonplace to consider 
 
 33.  Id. at 1317–25 (discussing the element of materiality in Part IIA of the opinion and the element 
of scienter in Part IIB of the opinion). 
 34.  See generally David McCord, A Primer for the Nonmathematically Inclined on Mathematical 
Evidence in Criminal Cases: People v. Collins and Beyond, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 741 (1990) 
(explaining the product rule). Another reason to decline to take this route is that courts would face the 
difficult if not insurmountable problem of determining the extent to which the individual elements are 
independent of each other.  
 35.  See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank, Pleading and the Dilemmas of Modern American Procedure, 93 
JUDICATURE 109, 118 (2009) (“Judgments about the plausibility of a complaint are necessarily 
comparative.”). 
 36.  Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 324 (2007). 
 37.  See United States v. Beard, 354 F.3d 691, 692–93 (7th Cir. 2004); Ronald J. Allen, Factual 
Ambiguity and a Theory of Evidence, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 604, 611 (1994). 
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alternative inferences. 
Consider a complaint involving a traffic accident on I-95: 
Plaintiff was driving southbound on I-95 in Florida on March 26, 2011. 
A car in front of plaintiff’s car stopped short. 
Plaintiff was able to stop her car in time to avoid hitting the car in front of her. 
Defendant was driving a car behind the plaintiff and did not stop until colliding with 
plaintiff’s car. 
In failing to stop before colliding with the plaintiff’s car, the defendant purposefully 
and intentionally assaulted the plaintiff because of the plaintiff’s sexual orientation.
38
 
I expect that you found the conclusion of purposeful assault based on sexual 
orientation rather jarring. Rule 8(b) permits an allegation of state of mind to be 
made generally, but Iqbal refuses to require that courts credit such an allegation 
and insists that it plausibly follow from the other allegations in the complaint.39 
The point is not that no one who crashed a car into someone else ever did so 
because of the victim’s sexual orientation and that courts should assume that no 
one ever will. Even highly unusual things happen sometimes. Instead, the point 
is that if a plaintiff alleges that this is what actually happened to him, the 
plaintiff must provide some allegation—other than just a general allegation 
regarding the defendant’s state of mind—plausibly suggesting that it did. 
In the absence of any other information, is purposeful assault based on 
sexual orientation a plausible inference? Not compared to the inference of 
insufficient attention, inadequate car maintenance, or too-slow reflexes, or even 
an accident that the defendant simply could not avoid. In rejecting the 
plausibility (in the absence of other information) of a purposeful assault based 
on sexual orientation, it would be natural to describe the competing inferences 
as more likely. And in expressing their rejection of the plausibility of the 
inferences that the plaintiffs sought to draw in Twombly and Iqbal, the Court 
similarly referred to other inferences as more likely.40 
But that should not be read to mean that the only inference that is plausible 
is the one that is more likely than any other—for that would be to try the case 
on the complaint. Moreover, Iqbal insists that the “plausibility standard is not 
 
 38.  See Brofman v. Fla. Hearing Care Ctr. Inc., 703 So. 2d 1191 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997) 
(involving a civil suit under the Florida hate crimes statutes, FLA. STAT. § 775.085 (2010)). 
 39.  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1954 (2009) (“Respondent finally maintains that the Federal 
Rules expressly allow him to allege petitioners’ discriminatory intent ‘generally,’ which he equates with 
a conclusory allegation. It follows, respondent says, that his complaint is sufficiently well pleaded 
because it claims that petitioners discriminated against him ‘on account of [his] religion, race, and/or 
national origin and for no legitimate penological interest.’ Were we required to accept this allegation as 
true, respondent’s complaint would survive petitioners’ motion to dismiss. But the Federal Rules do not 
require courts to credit a complaint’s conclusory statements without reference to its factual context . . . . 
Rule 8 does not empower respondent to plead the bare elements of his cause of action, affix the label 
‘general allegation,’ and expect his complaint to survive a motion to dismiss.”) (alteration in original) 
(internal citations omitted). 
 40.  Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 567 (2007) (“obvious alternative explanation”); 
Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1951 (“more likely explanations”). 
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akin to ‘a probability requirement,’”41 so it would be wrong to read Iqbal to 
require that the plaintiff’s proposed inference be more likely than competing 
inferences.42 Instead, these passages in Twombly and Iqbal should be 
understood simply to reflect that part of what can make an inference 
implausible is the existence of significantly better competing inferences. 
III 
SUGGESTIONS FOR DRAFTING AND DEFENDING COMPLAINTS 
In light of all this, how should a plaintiff go about drafting a complaint? It 
might be thought that a plaintiff should simply avoid conclusory allegations. I 
do not think so, for as Justice Kennedy explained in Iqbal, conclusory 
allegations can provide the framework for a complaint.43 They provide a 
framework by establishing what—at least as the plaintiff understands the 
substantive law—the elements of the right of action sued upon by the plaintiff 
are. I understand that it is frequently said that a complaint under the Federal 
Rules need not state all of the elements of a right of action. Indeed, Justice 
Ginsburg, writing for the court in Skinner, noted that “under the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure, a complaint need not pin plaintiff’s claim for relief to a 
precise legal theory.”44 The opinion in Matrixx, on the other hand, lists the five 
elements of a 10b-5 action and then evaluates whether the plaintiffs “have failed 
to plead both the element of a material misrepresentation or omission and the 
element of scienter,”45 evidently taking for granted that such elements had to be 
pleaded. 
Even if the complaint itself need not reveal a legal theory, in order to 
survive a 12(b)(6) motion, counsel must provide one.46 And in Skinner, Justice 
 
 41.  129 S. Ct. at 1949. 
 42.  See Fabian v. Fulmer Helmets, Inc., 628 F.3d 278, 281 (6th Cir. 2010) (noting that because 
conflicting inferences were both plausible, dismissal was inappropriate); Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., 614 
F.3d 400, 404 (7th Cir. 2010) (“For cases governed only by Rule 8, it is not necessary to stack up the 
inferences side by side and allow the case to go forward only if the plaintiff’s inferences seem more 
compelling than the opposing inferences.”); Hamilton v. Palm, 621 F.3d 816, 819 (8th Cir. 2010) ( “[The 
Plaintiff’s] complaint raised plausible inferences of both employee and independent contractor status. 
Which inference will prove to be correct is not an issue to be determined by a motion to dismiss.”); 
Courie v. Alcoa Wheel & Forged Prod., 577 F.3d 625, 630 (6th Cir. 2009) (finding the allegation of 
settlement agreement plausible based on the attachment of an unsigned settlement proposal as an 
exhibit to the complaint); Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559, 617 (2d Cir. 2009) (en banc) (Parker, J., 
dissenting) (“[Allegations] become implausible when the court’s commonsense credits far more likely 
inferences from the available facts”); W. Pa. Allegheny Health Sys., Inc. v. U.P.M.C., 627 F.3d 85, 98 
(3d Cir. 2010) (rejecting idea that “Twombly’s plausibility standard functions more like a probability 
requirement in complex cases”); Escuadra v. Geovera Specialty Ins. Co., 739 F. Supp. 2d 967, 981 (E.D. 
Texas 2010) (“Requiring a plaintiff’s theory to be more plausible than alternatives would mean that 
Rule 8’s pleading standard is more demanding than the PSLRA. It also would disregard both Twombly 
and Iqbal which made clear that Rule 8 does not establish a probability requirement.”). 
 43.  129 S. Ct. at 1950.  
 44.  Skinner v. Switzer, 131 S. Ct. 1289, 1296 (2011). 
 45.  Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 131 S. Ct. 1309, 1318 (2011). 
 46. See Kirksey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 168 F.3d 1039, 1041 (7th Cir. 1999) (stating that 
“plaintiffs . . . don't have to plead legal theories,” but that if “defendants filed a motion to dismiss . . . it 
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Ginsburg added that the complaint in that case was “not a model of the careful 
drafter’s art.”47 For that reason, I believe that it is the general practice of the 
bar, or at least those members of the bar who strive to practice the careful 
drafter’s art, to reveal a legal theory by including allegations of each element of 
a right of action in the complaint. And I suggest that the wisdom of doing so is 
underscored by Twombly, Iqbal, and now Matrixx. 
By including such allegations, a plaintiff not only makes clear his 
understanding of the legal theory or theories upon which the complaint relies 
(both to the reader and to himself) but can also point to them as the conclusory 
allegations not entitled to a presumption of truth, and distinguish them from the 
factual allegations that are entitled to the presumption of truth. 
The plaintiff must also, however, be sure to include factual allegations from 
which the conclusory allegations regarding each element of the right of action 
can reasonably be inferred. I would suggest that a well-crafted complaint should 
make clear, at least through its structure, which allegations are intended to be 
factual allegations entitled to the presumption of truth, and which are intended 
to be elements of the right of action that can reasonably be inferred from those 
factual allegations.48 Indeed, it may be useful, in a post-Twombly and Iqbal 
world, to structure a complaint to make clear which factual allegations support 
which conclusions. 
Some think that the demand for plausibility is a demand for factual 
specificity. To my mind, there is a no necessary connection between specificity 
and plausibility. Consider again the hypothetical complaint involving a traffic 
accident on I-95 and alleging purposeful assault because of the victim’s sexual 
orientation. Providing lots of specifics about the accident (time of day, precise 
location, speed of the cars, weather, even the VINs for each car) would do 
nothing to add to the plausibility of purposeful assault based on sexual 
orientation discrimination. Even specifics about the state of mind—were that 
possible—would do little to make the conclusion plausible. Rule 8(b) permits 
an allegation of state of mind to be made generally. Iqbal does not ask for more 
details about the state of mind; it asks for reasons to believe that state of mind 
existed. A demand for specificity asks, “Can you tell me about that in more 
detail?” A demand for plausibility asks, “Why should I think that?” 
Some have worried that Iqbal, by instructing judges to determine 
plausibility based on common sense and judicial experience, invited 
 
would not be responsive of the plaintiff to say that she was not ‘required at this stage of the litigation to 
specifically characterize or identify the legal basis of the claims in the complaint[]’”). 
 47.  131 S. Ct. at 1296. 
 48.  Cf. FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a)(1) (requiring a court to “find the facts specially and state its 
conclusions of law separately”). If the plaintiff has “personal knowledge of an element of a claim that 
he alleges . . . . it is simplest to view such an allegation as not conclusory—because it is not expressing 
an inference at all. Alternatively, one could view it as conclusory and ask whether it is plausible to infer 
that the conclusion is true, given that a person with personal knowledge says that it is true, but (without 
making a forbidden credibility determination) the answer to that inquiry will always be yes.” Hartnett,  
supra note 3, at 494 n.104. 
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idiosyncratic and subjective decisionmaking. I, on the other hand, have argued 
that the reference to common sense and judicial experience should be 
understood as a description of the ordinary operation of inductive reasoning.49 
It seems to me that judges view themselves as applying ordinary inductive 
reasoning, rather than being authorized to act on idiosyncratic and subjective 
understandings. I admit, though, that here it is hard to be confident that the fear 
is misplaced, because ordinary inductive reasoning is rooted in baseline 
assumptions about the way the world usually works, and although such baseline 
assumptions are shaped by one’s own experience, it is their nature to be 
perceived as widely accepted common sense. Accordingly, even if a judge’s 
baseline assumptions are not widely accepted common sense, a judge is likely to 
think them so. 
In recognition of the truth that inductive reasoning—and therefore the 
plausibility test—depends on baseline assumptions about the way the world 
usually works, I have suggested that lawyers, if they believe that a judge’s own 
knowledge and experience would likely have led him to inaccurate baseline 
assumptions about the way the world usually works, present information 
designed to dislodge those inaccurate baseline assumptions. I confess that I do 
not see much evidence that lawyers have attempted to do so. It might be that I 
do not see such evidence because, if successfully deployed, judges will write as if 
they understood the truth all along, rather than explain that they were blind, 
but now they see. So it may be that lawyers are doing so all the time, but in a 
way that is largely invisible to those who read judicial opinions.50 
It is also possible that lawyers are rarely trying to do so. If this is what is 
happening, I would reiterate my suggestion: If you believe that a judge’s own 
knowledge and experience would likely have led him to inaccurate baseline 
assumptions about the way the world usually works, present information 
designed to dislodge those inaccurate baseline assumptions.51 
Some of you may be thinking that none of these suggestions meet the most 
frequent problem you have dealing with Twombly and Iqbal: the inability to 
plead factual allegations from which one can plausibly infer an element because 
you need discovery in order to make such factual allegations. Here, I have made 
two related suggestions, one of which has gotten some support on the bench, 
the other that seems not to have penetrated the bar at all. 
The suggestion that has gotten some support on the bench is that discovery 
can proceed despite the pendency of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). I 
believe that argument is unassailable under the Federal Rules.52 Under Rule 
 
 49.  Hartnett, supra note 3 at 498. 
 50.  Some of the amicus briefs in Matrixx may have taught members of the Court how medical 
experts treat inferences of causation. See Matrixx, 131 S. Ct. at 1319–20 (citing amicus briefs in 
discussion of medical professionals relying on evidence of causation that is not statistically significant). 
 51.  Cf. Suzanna Sherry, Foundational Facts and Doctrinal Change, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 145, 184 
n.192 (suggesting that advocates “might benefit from understanding the hidden factual assumptions at 
issue in various doctrines and might resurrect the idea of the ‘Brandeis brief[]’”). 
 52.  But see New Albany Tractor, Inc. v. Louisville Tractor, Inc., 650 F.3d 1046, 1051 (6th Cir. 2011) 
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26(d), discovery may commence as soon as the discovery planning conference 
pursuant to Rule 26(f) has been held. In contrast to the PSLRA, there is no 
provision in the Federal Rules that automatically stays discovery upon the filing 
of a motion to dismiss. Indeed, a court is specifically authorized by Rule 12(i) to 
defer ruling on a 12(b)(6) motion until trial; thus a defendant who wishes such a 
stay of discovery must move for a stay and show good cause under Rule 26.53 
Judge Posner has explicitly relied on my argument, explaining that “[i]f the 
plaintiff shows that he can’t conduct an even minimally adequate investigation 
without limited discovery, the judge can presumably allow that discovery, 
meanwhile deferring ruling on the defendant’s motion to dismiss.”54 It is true 
that Judge Posner was writing in dissent, but he was dissenting from an opinion 
that reversed a 12(b)(6) dismissal and interpreted Twombly and Iqbal in a 
remarkably pro-plaintiff way, reading the plausibility test to require nothing 
more than “a story that holds together,” with the court asking itself, “could 
these things have happened[?]”55 The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 
has also noted, while praising the district court’s management of the case, that 
discovery continued during the pendency of a 12(b)(6) motion.56 
Even when defendants move to stay discovery pending a motion to dismiss, 
some post-Iqbal district courts deny the motion.57 Significantly, in doing so, 
 
(“The plaintiff apparently can no longer obtain the factual detail necessary because the language of 
Iqbal specifically directs that no discovery may be conducted in cases such as this, even when the 
information needed to establish a claim . . . is solely within the purview of the defendant . . . .”). 
 53.  See Hartnett, supra note 3, at 507–08; see also Suzette M. Malveaux, Front Loading and Heavy 
Lifting: How Pre-Dismissal Discovery Can Address the Detrimental Effect of Iqbal on Civil Rights 
Cases, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 65, 123–24 (2010) (discussing the notion of “plausibility discovery” 
within the framework of Rule 26); cf. David L. Noll, The Indeterminacy of Iqbal, 99 GEO. L.J. 117, 141–
43 (2010) (suggesting that the best way to “reconcile the Court’s decisions with the Rules is to read 
Iqbal and Twombly to implicitly recalibrate the showing of good cause Rule 26(c) requires to stay 
discovery pending resolution of a motion to dismiss,” but that, even understood this way, Iqbal did not 
cut off all pre-motion-to-dismiss discovery). 
 54.  Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d 400, 412 (7th Cir. 2010) (Posner, J., dissenting). 
 55.  Id. at 404. 
 56.  In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 618 F.3d 300, 311 (3d Cir. 2010) (“Significantly, the 
District Court allowed discovery to proceed while the motions to dismiss were pending. Plaintiffs’ 
amended pleadings were thus able to draw on documents produced and depositions taken . . . . The 
District Court skillfully managed the consolidated proceedings.”); cf. Mann v. Brenner, 375 F. App’x 
232, 239–40 (3d Cir. 2010) (finding no abuse of discretion in district court’s decision to stay discovery). 
See also Allstate Ins. Co. v. Levy, No. CV-10-1652(FB)(VVP), 2011 WL 288511, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 
27, 2011) (“The pendency of the motion to dismiss does not provide an automatic basis to stay 
discovery.”); Civil Rules Advisory Committee, Minutes, Nov. 15–16, 2010, 24–25 (lawyers reporting 
conflicting experience with stays being granted and a judge stating, “I don’t stay discovery.”) (internal 
quotations omitted); Reinert, supra note 21, at 20 (“The Fifth Circuit, like many other circuits, also has 
held that limited discovery may be appropriate where the plaintiff suffers from informational 
asymmetry with respect to essential elements of his claim.”).  
 57.  See, e.g., Baltayan v. Tito, No. 3:10-CV-1327(CFD), 2011 WL 1194305, at *2 (D. Conn. Mar. 
30, 2011) (noting that the court had already ordered that discovery was not stayed pending decision on 
a motion to dismiss); Lopez v. Sanders, No. 2:10-cv-76-DPM, 2011 WL 2679603, at *2 (E.D. Ark. July 8, 
2011) (agreeing that “the allegations are too thin” under Iqbal, but allowing time “to do some basic 
discovery” about the involvement of each defendant because “the undisputed fact remains that Lopez-
Alvarado was beaten to death at the prison while some officers were on duty”). 
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some courts emphasize the likelihood that even if the motion to dismiss were to 
be granted, leave to amend would likely also be granted, and discovery would 
be useful in drafting that amended complaint.58 One court has emphasized the 
particular importance after Twombly of avoiding an “overly lenient standard 
for granting motions to stay all discovery.”59 
The suggestion that seems to have gotten little traction among the bar is to 
abandon pleading on information and belief. The practice is a remnant from 
code pleading, particularly code pleading’s frequent commitment to verified 
pleadings. In a pleading regime marked by verified pleadings, pleading on 
information and belief was used to allow pleaders to allege matters that they 
could not verify. But the Federal Rules do not require verification. Today, while 
courts have found them permissible,60 an allegation made on information and 
belief runs the risk of being treated as a conclusory allegation, not entitled to 
the presumption of truth. 
If counsel’s pre-filing inquiry reveals an evidentiary basis for a factual 
allegation, then simply make the factual allegation. Do not dilute the force of 
the allegation with references to information and belief. But what if your pre-
filing inquiry fails to reveal an evidentiary basis for a factual allegation, yet you 
think that discovery will reveal such an evidentiary basis? Then do what Rule 
11(b)(3) explicitly instructs: Specifically identify the allegation as a factual 
contention that “will likely have evidentiary support after a reasonable 
opportunity for . . . discovery.” 
The two suggestions are related: By explicitly identifying particular factual 
allegations pursuant to Rule 11(b)(3), the attention of counsel and the court can 
be focused on the need for—and propriety of—discovery as to that factual 
allegation. Rather than arguing in the abstract about the appropriateness of 
discovery pending a 12(b)(6) motion, counsel and the court can focus more 
precisely on a narrower question: whether to allow discovery to enable the 
plaintiff to obtain evidence to support particular factual allegations that have 
been specifically identified, in the manner explicitly provided for by the Federal 
Rules, as needing discovery. Moreover, the terms of the debate about that 
question will be shaped by terms of Rule 11(b)(3) itself: Can it reasonably be 
expected that discovery will produce evidence to support that allegation? 
 
 58.  S.F. Tech. v. Kraco Enter., L.L.C., No. 5:11-cv-00355 EJD, 2011 WL 2193397, at *2–*3 (N.D. 
Cal. June 6, 2011) (noting that the “Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not provide for automatic or 
blanket stays of discovery” and that “district courts tend to look unfavorably” upon them, and 
particularly emphasizing that “discovery would not be wasted” even if the motion to dismiss were 
granted because the plaintiff “could utilize the discovery responses to prepare an amended pleading”); 
Cloverleaf Golf Course, Inc. v. FMC Corp., No. 11-cv-190-DRH, 2011 WL 2838178, at *4 (S.D. Ill. July 
15, 2011) (refusing to stay discovery because the defendant had not met its burden to justify a stay, and 
noting that the court could not presume that the motion to dismiss would be granted and that even if it 
were granted, plaintiff would likely have an opportunity to amend). 
 59.  Trzaska v. Int’l Game Tech., No. 2:10-cv-02268-JCM-GWF, 2011 WL 1233298, at *4 (D. Nev. 
Mar. 29, 2011). 
 60.  See Arista Records L.L.C. v. Doe 3, 604 F.3d 110, 120 (2d Cir. 2010); Boy Blue, Inc. v. Zomba 
Recording, L.L.C., No. 3:09-CV-483-HEH, 2009 WL 2970794, at *2 (E.D. Va. Sept. 16, 2009). 
HARTNETT 2/15/2012 4:55 PM 
No. 1 2012] TAMING TWOMBLY 51 
Perhaps such an inquiry might seem odd and difficult. But I would hope not. 
I would hope that it is similar to the thought process counsel engages in before 
deciding to take a case: “What makes me think, if I don’t already have it, that 
I’ll be able to get the evidence to prove all of the elements of the case?” Your 
reasons for so believing—your reasons for taking the case in the first place—can 
then be offered to the court as the reasons why the complaint should not be 
dismissed without allowing discovery as to those particular allegations.61 
IV 
A PROPOSED AMENDMENT 
I believe that all of these methods of dealing with Twombly and Iqbal are 
permitted under the current Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Yet I also readily 
admit that these suggestions are not complete solutions, in part because the 
Rules do not make clear how a judge is supposed to handle an allegation 
specifically identified pursuant to Rule 11(b)(3). A judge might exercise his 
discretion to simply stay discovery during the pendency of a motion to dismiss 
without grappling with the likelihood of obtaining discovery to support such an 
allegation. And given the skepticism with which Twombly and Iqbal treat 
careful case management, this might be the path of least resistance for some 
judges.62 
Accordingly, I have also suggested an amendment to Rule 12(b) that, I 
believe, reasonably accommodates the competing interests of plaintiffs who 
need discovery to support their case and defendants who fear massive discovery 
costs despite a meritless claim. As an accommodation of the competing interests 
that assumes the continued viability of Twombly and Iqbal, I believe that it also 
has a better chance of being adopted than proposals that seek to repudiate 
those decisions. If I am right that it reasonably accommodates the competing 
interests, please support the proposal. If it does not, please tell me. 
I propose adding a new subsection to the end of Rule 12: 
Rule 12(j): Allegations Likely To Have Evidentiary Support After a Reasonable 
Opportunity for Discovery 
If, on a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) or 12(c) that has not been deferred until trial, the 
claim sought to be dismissed includes an allegation specifically identified as provided 
in Rule 11(b)(3) as likely to have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity 
for discovery, the court must either (1) assume the truth of the allegation, or (2) 
decide whether the allegation is likely to have evidentiary support after a reasonable 
opportunity for discovery. In deciding whether an allegation is likely to have 
evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for discovery, the court must 
 
 61.  Cf. Guirguis v. Movers Specialty Servs., Inc., 346 F. App’x 774, 776 (3d Cir. 2009) (noting that 
the complaint conclusorily alleged that plaintiff was fired based on his national origin but never 
intimated in any way why the plaintiff believed that national origin motivated the firing).  
 62.  District courts in the Sixth Circuit might no longer see themselves as having any discretion in 
the matter. See New Albany Tractor, Inc. v. Louisville Tractor, Inc., 650 F.3d 1046 (6th Cir. 2011) (“The 
plaintiff apparently can no longer obtain the factual detail necessary because the language of Iqbal 
specifically directs that no discovery may be conducted in cases such as this, even when the information 
needed to establish a claim . . . is solely within the purview of the defendant . . . .”). 
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consider the parties’ access to evidence in the absence of discovery and state on the 
record the reason for its decision. 
If the court decides that the allegation is likely to have evidentiary support after a 
reasonable opportunity for discovery, it must allow for that discovery, under the 
standards of Rule 26, and deny the motion to dismiss. If the court decides that the 
allegation is not likely to have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for 
discovery, the court must treat the motion as one for summary judgment under Rule 
56, and provide all parties a reasonable opportunity to present all the material that is 
pertinent to the motion. 
I believe that this proposal accommodates the interests of plaintiffs who lack 
evidentiary support for a particular allegation, by protecting them from their 
worst fear under Twombly and Iqbal: having their claims dismissed because any 
possible supportive evidence is in the hands of the defendant, without a court 
ever directly confronting the question of whether they would likely be able to 
get such supportive evidence if given the opportunity for discovery. If the court 
assumes the truth of the allegation and nonetheless dismisses, it will not be 
because of the inability to access supporting evidence. If the court does not 
assume the truth of the allegation, it must decide whether the allegation is likely 
to have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for discovery and, if 
so, allow appropriate discovery. And in making this determination, the proposal 
specifically directs judges to consider the parties’ access to evidence in the 
absence of discovery. 
It accommodates the interests of defendants by providing a means of getting 
reasonably prompt judicial attention to the question of whether the defendant 
can avoid the costs of discovery, either because the plaintiff loses even if 
discovery turns up what he seeks or because there is no reason to think that 
discovery will turn up what he seeks. 
And it gives both plaintiffs and defendants an incentive to focus their 
attention (and the court’s) on what are likely to be the determinative issue or 
issues in the case. Those allegations identified under Rule 11(b)(3) are more 
likely than other issues to be determinative, or at least more likely to be 
determinative in the pretrial context. This can, I believe, promote the court’s 
(and the public’s) interest in efficiency. 
The proposal is designed to protect plaintiffs who think they already have 
evidentiary support for a particular allegation, but realize that a judge might 
disagree. If identifying an allegation under Rule 11(b)(3) meant that a judge 
would simply disregard the allegation in deciding a 12(b)(6) motion when the 
judge thought that discovery would not likely lead to supporting evidence, 
plaintiffs might be rather wary of making such identifications. Under this 
proposal, if the judge refuses to allow discovery, the result is not that the 
allegation is disregarded; instead, plaintiffs have an opportunity to present the 
evidence they do have, in an effort to convince the court that there is a triable 
issue even without discovery on that point. Thus, plaintiffs would have an 
incentive to properly identify such allegations, because they would get the 
protection of the new provision. They have a countervailing incentive, however, 
to not identify too many of their allegations this way, for that would likely make 
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a judge rather skeptical. 
Identifying an allegation as one made pursuant to Rule 11(b)(3) provides 
the pleader with a crucial advantage under my proposal: It requires the court 
either to assume that the allegation is true or to decide whether it is likely to 
have evidentiary support after an opportunity for discovery. A court cannot, as 
it might today and as happened in both Twombly and Iqbal, simply refuse to 
credit an allegation made on information and belief that it deems conclusory 
and never explicitly confront the question of whether discovery would likely 
yield evidentiary support. Nor does this inquiry simply replicate the plausibility 
analysis, because the reasonableness of inferring X is different from the 
reasonableness of finding evidence to support X—as criminal procedure’s 
distinction between sufficiency of the evidence to convict and probable cause to 
search demonstrates.63 
If the court reaches the question whether discovery is likely to produce 
evidence supporting an allegation, it must consider the parties’ access to the 
evidence without discovery. If a party has access to the evidence without 
discovery, but has not come up with it, it is less likely that discovery will 
produce that evidence than if the party did not have access to it without 
discovery. It is easier for a judge in the first situation than in the second to say, 
“If you haven’t come up with it yet, I don’t think discovery will help.” 
V 
CONCLUSION 
I think that Twombly and Iqbal are here to stay, and that there are a variety 
of ways in which they can be tamed. I am largely encouraged that courts tend to 
be confining the label “conclusory” to allegations that are equivalent to the 
elements of a right of action, and inquiring whether that conclusion can 
reasonably be inferred from the factual allegations of the complaint, rather than 
broadly inquiring into the believability of each allegation. I have some worries 
about Matrixx, but think they are manageable as well. I would urge the bar to 
give up on “information and belief” and follow the instructions of Rule 
11(b)(3), thereby focusing attention on the need for discovery and the 
discretion that district courts have to allow it, even pending a motion to dismiss. 
I would also urge the bar to be on the lookout for ways to provide information 
that could change a judge’s baseline assumptions about the way the world 
usually works and therefore alter his view of the plausibility of an inference. 
I certainly do not claim that courts are uniformly acting in accord with these 
suggestions. My point is far more modest: These methods of taming Twombly 
and Iqbal remain viable, and therefore lawyers and judges should consider 
them. Finally, I would urge you to also consider whether my proposed 
amendment to Rule 12(b) meets the needs of the bar and the clients they 
represent. 
 
 63.  See Hartnett, Taming Twombly, supra note 3, at 506–07. 
